Abstract团队为何会失败 阐述事实

很长且图文并茂的简单写一下 作为从主网上线参与至今且100%记得所有事情的深度用户，客观的把一些发生在 Abstract 上令人唾弃的事情罗列出来，大家就知道为何高开低走 直至如今跳崖结束了L2之旅

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阅读指南

①哪些生态项目赚走了钱，生态项目筛选的重大失职： Gacha、Amigo、Monster、Rugpull Bakery的详细介绍+生态全方面总结点评

②资金方面分析：关于在Abstract上的几次售卖如Mystery Box、迪士尼IP合作盒子、奥特曼抽奖盒子、女团两次勋章售卖+以及Defillama收入数据+勋章难度

③两次顶级的 彻底毁掉Abstract的决定+勋章获取难度巨高

④返佣链接问题 钱不多 但团队操作令人唾弃——吸足每一滴血

⑤Abstract团队的近期的矛盾点+个人一些看法和吐槽+团队把责任第一时间撇清

⑥用人不当 Phin 和 Raj 这俩废柴 Ecosystem 生态负责人都吃饭不做事的，端起碗吃肉 放下碗骂娘那种人

⑦Luca的吹嘘与假话（证据确凿的 有视频为证）

⑧总结

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①哪些生态项目赚走了钱，生态项目筛选的重大失职： Gacha、Amigo、Monster、Rugpull Bakery的详细介绍+生态全方面总结点评

@gacha_game_ 首当其冲：

是 25 年 2 月第一批加入Abs的生态项目也是最会榨取的项目： 他们的co-founder @tanialemon_ 在26年2月份（刚好1年）的时候很高兴的宣布了自己团队在Abstract上赚取了500万美金这个里程碑

也同时直接跑了 宣布转型到TCG 把刮刮卡关停，当时大奖池大约 7-8 万美元，没人中过，团队表示会把剩余大奖按积分/贡献，用 Gacha Pull 余额返给老用户实际上是额度 继续骗人来开卡抽奖

而他们之前的大奖至今0人获得，只是个噱头，欺骗了所有人 这个最早期就引入到Abstract的生态中，且出过两次勋章 一次抽奖勋章，一次隐藏勋章 引导所有人去赌 去亏钱 他们的抽奖ev是负的，所有人只是为了XP而去

我除了做勋章抽过几次亏了几十U 就再也没碰过 但很多人早期的亏损就在这 因为最早期的XP很难获得 同时Luca这个唐氏大脑袋一直暗示年底发币 有人为了多拿点XP 不得不去梭 很明显 Abstract 团队对他们进行了0监管+100%的XP支持 从而最早期的大部分玩家都被坑惨了 不仅不监管 而且第二次隐藏勋章需要去刮五百次才能解锁 更是助长这个毫无意义的消费平台赚钱 至今都有很多人在上面玩 只能说消费能力还是太强了 怪不得说Tania他们本来都亏完了准备失败 上Abstract后直接一波赚的起飞 印钞机 现在项目方在游艇美女了

Gacha的主合约地址 0x999920ac0adb76f96f63d6aacebd8b7890ed09d2

协议费地址 0x3272596F776470D2D7C3f7dfF3dc50888b7D8967

再提供一组数据：DefiLlama 上这个产品在 Abstract 的累计费用大约 1555 万美元，开包金额减去回购返给玩家的部分，目前协议净收入大约 309 万美元，全是早期用户的血汗钱😄

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@TryAmigoApp 也很无敌 无法理解生态负责人上线这个垃圾套着社交外壳实际是PVP的脑回路

创始人 @BeanzJonny 四月份最后出来冒了个头 圈完发现圈不到钱就跑路了，而且这个项目 Abstract花了很大的精力推广，在今年再一次狠狠的榨取了资金，我全程0参与 同时和微信群各位说别参与 这个项目很垃圾，不出意外 外国社区的很多人被坑惨了

上来就是只能下载APP才能玩，很难想象 一个完全几乎不支持手机端的Abs钱包，选择这样的方式上线（提前半年多就在准备预热了 发布的时候网页端都没有一个）然后就是和发币一样 自己内定的人才能去发key 让用户买 没人买价格就上不去 谁买几乎就等于接盘，发key的人能吃爽税

不难看出 Abstract团队里面有人勾兑了项目方 组局在这把所有人都坑了3 月 6 日Key开交易 几天发现没人玩 承诺降低费率 要上线网页啥的 就连网页端开发都是个生死局 这几把是个准备了半年的项目？最后连网页端都没上线就匆匆结束了圈钱 至于是谁引入的这个项目我不知道 肯定是个很傻很没脑子的人 才会配合和宣传这样的垃圾项目 当时那种造势...让人觉得是多么厉害一个项目唉

明显的亲戚盘 不知道哪个人的朋友被联系上了 匆匆回来创个业 没排上号 本来想趁热搞一波结束，当时这个创始人就一两百个粉丝，后面应该是换人接管了 又排上号了 美滋滋回来26年2月 暴力推广出来 啧啧 说这样的创始人咋联系上项目方的 怎么会值得这么大力量的推广？而且还是在今年年初这样的危险时期 存亡之际 依旧保持向社区提现资金

POV：“谁有多余资金”

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隆重介绍 接下来出场的是 @monstersdotfun

没错 就是那个曾宣传最浩荡、Mint价格最高、圈的最快的、有13.6W粉丝、一年没更新、伟大的 值得被钉在耻辱柱上的项目 @monstersdotfun ！！！

4 月底先卖权益，游戏还没上。官宣 750 个创世 NFT，单价 0.125 ETH，圈走93.75 ETH铸造费用 然后地板一度到 2000U 以上 随后？随后直接跑了 价格一路跌至1U 美滋滋吧 NFT在Opensea的合约地址是

0x38272b362bca267dc8e9120087c93cefb86a69ac

感兴趣的可以去看看 这项目太有意思了 作为一个游戏 网站只放了几只宠物跳一跳 就能赚走几十万美金 创始人早已查无此人 已注销 懂？噱头就是Abstract大力支持 网页上的排行榜奖励写的是“平台手续费分成”和“未来代币空投”

跑路了官方一点都不作为 就当没事人一样 任其跑 谁对接的也不知道 某个团队的兄弟伙伴？有没有内部勾兑 如果有 那真的很恶心 如果没有 那么真的很蠢 把用户当成自己的消费品 去给别人抬轿子了 真的可悲 消费链纯消费来了 很多人接盘了这个NFT一路归零 也是Abstract社区至今令人唾弃的黑历史

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今年团队做了一次"很不错"的尝试就是 @OnchainChemists

99.99999%是团队自己做的项目 账号2月底注册 3月马上上线Abstract的Spotlight Apps， Luca和团队各位第一时间关注，推出的这个叫Rugpull Bakery游戏，中文名叫“开心煮面包” 就是全自动Gas贡献器 通过让玩家卷排名 不断的提供Gas fee 从而变成链收入

只有前三名能拿到奖励 其他人的Fee都变成Abstract链的收入了 而且前三名团队也需要很难才能拿到奖励 而且完全不制止脚本 轻松导致崩盘 很差的飞轮玩法

今年3月份推出的时候还想着项目方终于要做点正事了 而且同时还出了个勋章 这也让平台爽吃了一波 第一季的数据是 用户花在交易上大约 17.3 万美元，奖池大约 7.6 万美元(那么玩家净亏就是大约 9.7 万美元)交易超过 1000 万笔，这也是为什么从DefiLlama上看 那段时间数据很不好的原因了 爽的一批啊 团队吃晕厥过去了，这一波也让中文社区Meow他们带领的那一批亏麻了的 最后被挤出前三 后面几季更极端，第二季改成 7 天，奖池分前五，同时被骂机器人和小号互 rug

大家又失败的亏了很多钱 没人继续玩了 Oh fuck 团队在做什么？

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Abstract上的项目引入非常差非常差 只能说你想这么差其实也需要一定水平

Myriad 不知道是哪个引入的 上线Abstract的时候就在，AMM 买卖通常收约 3%，流动性极差 而且盲订单 看不到挂单和对手盘的流动性，只能说做的跟狗屎没太大区别，这样的项目却在同时期数据非常好，如今他已经是路边一条 今年3月份他被CZ提到一下 马上就抛弃了依旧在为他提供费用赖以生存的Abs 掉头美滋滋的润到BSC了 现已是丧家之犬，但都已经算是很不错的项目了 因为能通过刷免费的交易 只需要花费少量的Gas就能获得高额排名从而获得高额XP，这也是去年很多玩家在悄悄做的事情 可以理解为Farm XP 但是他妈全是垃圾项目 这样低成本Farm也是没招了

Roach Racing Club 都算是少数有能看得下去的游戏 今年项目方 @0xroachcoach 也是遭不住了 五月份选择离开Abstract

Moody Madness 也肯定是老熟人联系上来的，全程吸大家钱各种通行证 各种玩游戏 前中期给高额XP之类的，包括后续那个啥jb弹珠游戏 也纯是为了给这个链刷TX 无用功 是链在强迫大家 强迫用户和生态刷数据，才能给XP 没办法，这毫无意义 在4399能被人骂成筛子的游戏，在Abstract居然算是一个顶级贡献者了🤣而且至今不知道到底赚了多少钱 搞活动居然有高达100U的奖金 抠搜

Office Worker老板牌和Gigaverse 本来做的好好的 最后撑不住发了一波NFT跑了、Gigaverse高开低走沉浸在自己的剪刀石头布中 后面大世界也失败了 目前全员认真经营油管youtube中 唉 没招了 几百u开的果汁会员呢 我也不知道咋办 还有买的rom 以及以前投入的心血写攻略 就是为了让大家能少走弯路 结果最后现在发现开头就是弯路没招了

Cambria...哎 不叹不叹

还有那个 Dojo、Deathfun、Witty、BLINKO、Laser Party全尼玛是赌博的 而且也全是100% 纯-ev赌博 那么他妈钱呢 你们自己做的还是找人做的项目呢 几十个粉丝几百个粉丝就能上线Portal 你说没关系？我不信

前段时间Robinhood上那么火热的 Stonkbrokers @ClutchMarkets 去年就在联系Abstract 结果被Raj拉黑了你敢信🤣

Abstract团队的筛选dapp能力非常非常差劲 不仅是游戏 赌博 还有Defi Luca说什么流动性不足
这能怪谁啊 还不是用人非常垃圾 全对接的小作坊defi 气死人

不去对接主流Defi项目 不配合拿Pengu或者其他做激励 纯他妈小作坊啊 Kona和Aborean 这些不是熟人项目我都死去

兄弟？ 一点激励不给 别人TVL为什么要存进来 存进来放钱包又不能玩Meme
又不能买NFT 也没有各路的Dev能来创业
有这这么大一层屏障 就像苹果商店一样 审核员是个傻子
只会选垃圾项目 和熟人关系项目 其他有能力的 或者会玩的人 都进不来
只能去Robinhood上大展拳脚
所以你懂做一条L2吗 什么都不会 为什么还要做 我真求你了

这俩Defi Kona就懒得喷了 很一般 Aborean的双币模型是几百年前的东西了也还在搞 @Aborean和那个煞笔创始人 Alexander 天天在那装神弄鬼发意义不明的图片做市拿 ABX 天天卖 @Jackwelth中文区大户Jack哥都骂过他几次是不折不扣的骗子 你为啥还要关注他 让他做Abs的defi基础？ 5月份还跑路说宣布上以太坊主网另发币 又骗了一堆老外去买ABX 又被割了一茬😜 你就一句 Defi生态系统缺乏 流动性不足
那就说你做了啥啊@LucaNetz

除了 @Skarly 的 Onchain Heroes 以及 企鹅牌 Vibes TCG 算是从头到尾很不错的项目 其他的大部分都是为了赚钱而来 还是非常没水平的 现在也都得迁移到Robinhood去了

还有团队那个Beans 跑去Robinhood创业好久了 应该也是早就知道消息要跑路了，提前去创业赚了一波生活费和购买法拉利的钱，快哉快哉** **

②资金方面分析：关于在Abstract上的几次售卖如Mystery Box、迪士尼IP合作盒子、奥特曼抽奖盒子、女团两次勋章售卖+以及Defillama收入数据+勋章难度

黑色星期五 Mystery Box 第一波爽圈

去年11 月 28开卖的 48小时限时销售 搞的很fomo 没几下全卖完了 全员带货那种哦~铸过的钱包还能领一枚不可转让的 SBT 我去 是SBT damn！太有用了

舒服晕了 被坑惨成傻福单价 99.99 美元 卖了似乎是七千多个 又舒舒服服七十多万美金收入囊中，只需要发点深圳小玩偶啥的就能轻松打发，草拟吗 咋赚钱这么容易啊操 有人抢着买了一堆 比如 @YNOvv1 亏舒服了的哈哈

迪士尼IP合作 开始第二波爽圈

Cryptoys 做的 Mickey and Friends，不是Igloo自己的盒子，去年12月15预热，17日开卖，盲盒 40 美元一个，开出来是可升级的 3D 玩具 NFT，Portal发了两枚勋章：集齐 1 个领 Flash Badge（成本40U相当于），集齐 10 个再领一枚隐藏勋章（成本400U）

Abstract 生态的人，包括当时还在团队的 Shiv，公开带节奏，并说领了勋章加 2000 XP，卖的时候大家还抢的火热 很多人还买了一堆 我就买了几个号 亏了一百多u 舒服死了

这钱爽不爽 总结是爽总量卖了多少呢？5000个 5000×40U=20WU 没错 这波又一晚上速通20W收入，爱了吗@LucaNetz

所以 lfg 继续卖第三波

奥特曼IP合作 第三波圈爽

奥特曼Tsuburaya，Bythen 在 Abstract 上发 今年1月26就开始隆重预告，28 日上线勋章Flash Badge 领取条件是在 Bythen Treasure 买一个盲盒，盒子3U一个 不知道卖了多少个盒子 勋章显示是13350 简单按2-4W个盒子卖出吧 收入高达6-12WU，给了什么？ 给了可爱的The Ultra Badge以及合成后没人买单的NFT
这波NFT也坑了特别多人 那么钱去哪里了？？？？

问题在于 每一个人都没赚到钱，钱呢？噢噢应该是进有些人的口袋里了 这奥特曼IP有多假就不用说了 操
几百块钱买的版权那种感觉 然后就狠狠这么多钱走

还有两个更早的 去年女团合作 ，tripleS Badge和ARTMS Superfan Badge两次： 两次都搞了勋章 3.3U一张 买一张以上才能领Badge 链上显示tripleS勋章25000个、ARTMS勋章16000个，一共41000个 起码这里又是12-15WU的收入吧 换来了Luca和女团的合照？luca美女的小手牵爽了是吧~

你看 简单举例几个就有百万美金的收入，舍Abstract其谁？

而且这些收入都是Abstract和Pengu收入囊中的 不存在什么第三方赚差价😄

所以 @LucaNetz 说的亏损千万美元 到底亏到哪里去了 我百思不得其解

于是我打开 defillama

defillama.com/revenue/chain/abstract

发现怎么所有数据都显示赚的盆满钵满 钱花哪里去了啊 求你了 公布一下 我知道明细花到正确的地方后一定闭口一句话不说 发工资去了？还是随份子去了说清楚啊 一天几千U的Gas吃了这么久 怎么可能会缺钱啊 L2运营很费钱吗 还是说半年才更新而且还需要告知世界的黑暗模式很难研究 这些花费了Igloo的千万美元？

③两次顶级的 彻底毁掉Abstract的决定+勋章获取难度巨高

两次史诗级的改革 彻底毁掉Abstract的决定

第一个是去年10 月 21，被动持有 NFT 和 Meme 的 XP 大约砍掉一半，本身就是以Meme为主的L2 持有和玩Meme几乎不给XP，差不多那个消息出来后 Meme全线暴跌 老外很多本来在Abstract上发币 做内幕集团 玩的不亦乐乎，可能Abs团队没赚到钱吧 干脆就一刀砍死了 一波把全部人砍走了

第二个是今年3 月 17，宣布持有NFT不给XP了，只有官方选的NFT持有才给XP了，而且还要按排名什么什么的 搞的特别恶心人，BUUMEE、pengztracted、Glowbud这些NFT 本来地板价都是0.01E左右 这一砍导致全部归零了，大家玩的好好的 搞这种 美滋滋了 NFT再也无法在只有内幕XP决定的这条链上发展，只剩下几个NFT苟活 也没啥意义了 ，完全是独裁 以XP为筹码裁定所有人的资产

经过这两次砍的应该都是亏麻了的 Meme我没玩 所以没亏 第二批是因为一直持有NFT拿XP 被砍后我手里上百个NFT直接归零 几千U变成0 美滋滋 我大额亏损也差不多来源于这里

Robinhood证明Meme和NFT 结合股票以及各种Dev任其发展才能兴盛一条链，Abstract通过不知道哪个成员 说话可能都流口水的人吧 做的决定 砍死了Meme和NFT 咋可能还能活下去 完全100%的榨取资金

大家也没招啊 团队不做人 人为刀俎 我为鱼肉 据说年底要TGE 只能忍着了 砍了就砍了吧 骂两句算了 TGE后再吐槽吧 那时候只能忍着...

勋章获取难度巨高：打开勋章页面 看到这一面墙的勋章

这些勋章到底赚了多少钱？ 不知 每个勋章都有几万个人铸造 每次都能赚点钱
@LucaNetz 知道有多复杂 多难拿吗 圈上的这些勋章知道有多赚钱吗 站在用户的角度
把这些勋章全部拿一遍
你但凡能体验一遍就知道有多难了 Clippy The Threadoor这些勋章有多难拿你知道吗 曹尼玛 起码都是几个月的努力
这些生态的勋章全都送钱还得做任务 你说你没赚到钱？？？我去你大坝的 我真想变成祖国人 把你挂在最高的电线杆上 让你抱着电脑挨个去做这些任务 做不完就用激光扫你 再把团队里勾兑贪污和完全不会做事 全部做圈钱决定的人一拳打飞 操

④返佣链接问题 钱不多 但团队操作令人唾弃——吸足每一滴血？

很值得吐槽的点 官网Discover做的直达链接 能带Ref的几乎全部带了Ref 目的是为了吃返佣，有人懂吗 连你几毛钱都不舍得放过

比如Gigaverse、以前的BigCoin Deathfun这些 全都带了邀请链接的

吃返佣为了干啥？吃了一年多这些钱啥也没干 上个月把这吃完的钱全跨走了🤣真是取之尽锱铢 全部钱都不想发过 合作项目的项目方收到的返佣都要吃满 一点不肯放过 这是Ref链收钱的钱包：

portal.abs.xyz/profile/0x66aC98701bb48926114577bA85e0D0487a9CD2dA

Debank能看到 9月份就把这些钱转到下面这个地址了 然后成功的从Stargate跨出去了

都到了这个地址： 0x37232647E0f7A48A256f13fDF4a8ABa4Fe6259E4 最后通过 @RAILGUN_Project evm隐私桥走出去了 很谨慎
一点都不让查清楚是哪个人吃走了 这个事实也能证明 一个月前他们就在计划跑路了 美滋滋的 把这些邀请吃来的钱又不知道拿去干啥
以前美名曰用于金库 现在感觉是放到某人自己的小金库去了

⑤Abstract的近期的情况与矛盾点+个人一些看法和吐槽+团队把责任第一时间撇清

8月份 Abstract项目的部分成员还在努力 可能为了发币吧 那时候据说是已经联系好 在准备好发币了 和Openworld进行合作 发币tge这部分交给ow啥的 为了稳住社区的用户 搞了个打电话活动 三生有幸被列为主要用户 给我安排了一个时间打电话 我没接 因为我觉得都是车轱辘话 没必要听

后面听朋友说其实就是讲了别跑路 相信一下 马上第二阶段 要发币了 年底出结果 于是...我更认真的签到了 在外面玩都不忘这些 常常回家认真打开大号小号签到 资金也都没取 放在Defi上面 虽然已经没什么XP了

那时候团队领头羊Cygaar已经失联几个月了 我也抱着最后能有个交代 就是交代盘 能发个币 然后让用户少亏点 顶级玩家 比如有Giga 和下面那个role的 有铂金 钻石 以上的 多少能挽回一点吧 预期很低了 几千u就够了 对比去年觉得会拿到几万U 十几万U的空投 我已经觉得降低到无法再低的程度了

现在看来非常矛盾 团队想一出是一出 团队有几个人一直Bullish 说按计划行事中 没出岔子 团队另外的人几乎都离职的离职 跑路为上 而且跑路了第一时间马上背刺Abs社区 和社区吵架 阴阳怪气 大概这个Tge和不Tge左右周旋了几个月时间 最终近期Luca在团队中一锤定音 决定不发币 然后改名了 然后昨天就发布了失败的公告

除了做勋章 我几乎0赌博 0炒币 因为我深知赌博的下场 以前家里有人赌博差点倾家荡产 每次做完勋章 第一时间发布图文或者视频教程 目的就一个 大家在参与Abstract的人也很多 每个人都投入很多 很多人早期控制不住自己 也不知道咋玩 我出勋章教程各种路子都是为了省时间为主帮助大家 跑路的这些项目以及明显要圈钱要吸血的我都不会去参与也不会发 除了必要的勋章教程和一些生态游戏工具啥的教程 我一般都不会去乱花钱 买meme也是一点不碰 纯存钱 几万u 几千u都存进去 一存一个号就是半年 就为了拿点XP 放几万十几万U在Abstract钱包里面分着 风险很大啊 毕竟Abstract以前被盗过 我天天担心这上面的defi跑路 毕竟这个kona和aborean都不是啥正经路子的 所幸一直没rug 不然我真要饭去了 感恩 不过心惊胆战拿到一裤子的XP价值0 不感恩 wcnm

唯一亏损就在于花了可能平均每个号50-100+U去做勋章 然后就是 去年年底那段时间 买了很多很多nft 因为持有nft 一个nft20多u 持有一周啥也不干给一两千XP 是你 你买吗？就像每个项目有最低路径一样 研究出来了就买了一堆 稳了几个月呢 几个月都稳定一直在20多U的价格 大家都稳定的每周几万 几十万XP 我大号每周十几万XP 小号每周几万XP 那时候算算XP的价值 oh fuck 感觉自己要变成elon 3月份有一天 宣布nft不给XP了 那一刻 感觉自己变成了sbf 大家几千上万U的nft全归零 美滋滋

nft爆亏 于是今年其实都没干啥 一直存钱 有个群每天还在玩那个Mog和Toll这些游戏 还有很多小白 很多新来的 他们不懂以前的abs 也一直在玩 唉 能劝的其实都劝别玩了 因为中文区最顶级的用户全认识 大家已经完全没啥信心了 Abstract团队年初的昏招频出 后面每次做出什么事情都感觉是个人都想笑的程度 也就没更新相关的内容了 玩其他项目和活动为主 不过又因为沉没成本投入巨大 只能眼睁睁看着 看Abs一步一步的搞垮社区 毁掉信任

老外天天骂 我每天去点赞支持 没用啊 团队根本不听任何建议 我行我素 一直一条路走到黑 你说 @LucaNetz 到底干了啥 他天天就在那做自己的宏伟web2实业 让一群完全不懂web3如何运营一条L2的人 用自己的手段反复榨取社区 他们也许早知道Abs会失败 也许他们故意让Abs失败 raj说自己在过去两年工作了数百个小时 笑死 每个认真参与Abstract的玩家都在上面投入的数百个小时 raj这些团队的人 还有工资赚 还玩的爽 现在拍拍屁股走人 留下烂摊子 后面还能再在web3再就业 唉 懒得喷 团队里内斗和畜生太多了 各做各的 各自一点配合没有 做的决定也都非常差 完全不像有过任何web3参与经验的人做的

OK这部分讲多了 我们言归正传： 昨天宣布失败 提款 那么这过去几个月项目方账号在干啥？

官推在发： “你们还相信Abs吗 相信请留下AGW地址” “保持目标” “Abstract新明星选手”

POV：如果让你运营一个账号 每天只需要流口水这样发帖

而且最扯的是什么 上周还他妈在Happy XP Day 这周就完完全全彻底的宣布失败

准备好了资金迁出网站 准备好了用户不平等条约 避免被起诉 准备好了完整的说辞

就像 @0xSinet 说的一样
Abstract 把钱包扣为人质 必须勾选那个框，否则就进不了钱包

如果你勾选了，这就是你同意的内容：

1. 仅仲裁，不得集体诉讼
2. 他们对你的最大责任赔偿是 100 美元（或你支付给他们的任何费用）
3. 如果你丢失钱包或资金的访问权限，即使是他们自己的疏忽，他们也不承担责任
4. 你有 1 年的时间起诉，之后就永远没了
5. 你的 XP 作为链下记录保留 6 个月

直达： https://x.com/0xSinet/status/2107655973573664958?s=20

⑥25年10月离职的Phin @PhinTotten 以及目前在任的这个 @RajPatel 也算是很大一个病因了 两个人玩的很好 完全就是亲兄弟呢

他在职的时候做的都是些垃圾事 在职的时候去年一年把社区几乎剥削干净了，大户亏几十万U的比比皆是，他就是当时对外的市场负责人 负责 Portal 上架和勋章引流的

可以说这些垃圾项目多半经过他的勾兑或者筛选吧，能筛选出这么多垃圾的项目也真是够牛逼——————刚好暴跌后跑路撇清关系 后续反复嘲讽社区 一言难尽 只能说玩过Abstract且了解过社区的人都会讨厌这个人

他离职的时候还很装作深情自己怎么怎么样爱Abs 离职后就变脸开嘲讽了 不知道谁惹怒了他 一个失败的员工 把一条链毁掉一大半绝对是他的功劳 而他很爱装逼 也很爱嘲讽人 菜而不自知 没办法啊 @yeet 还给这种人挂标当营销主管真是废了哈哈

变脸大王

包括现在啥也做不了的 @RajPatel 就像无能的丈夫 只能去找Phin
两个人不知道是里应外合还是咋的 玩的可好了 内外兼攻
当负责人成功搞垮Abs？🤣Raj可爱黏着Phin了 可能是...？ 不知道哪个是0 哪个是1 反正非常不尊重人 所以他们也不值得我尊重

如图是两个人前几天给用户比中指 庆祝Party
而Abstract用户沉浸在被Rug的悲伤中，Nice job
他们觉得自己很酷 爱露脸是吧
希望未来被人断腿的时候没这么开心lol @geniexbtz come on bro

两个没用的死鸡佬

这俩人没做啥好事，就算做了好事那也不是什么好人，端着碗吃饭 放下碗就骂娘，过河拆桥 忘恩负义 Phin离职第一时间就是清空抛售钱包，美美润走了，俗话说是风吹两边倒的两面派 再俗话一点说呢：

“Phin和Raj两个人简直就是蒋介石”

至于其他团队成员我就不攻击了 唉 你们哪些人做了事情哪些人天天敷衍社区一目了然，拿着工资默默退出吧 我知道你们被Luca下了禁令不能回复也不能发表看法，Luca选择自己一个人承担:实际上他就是沉默装哑

⑦最后再来看看Luca的吹嘘与假话（证据确凿的 有视频为证）没有他以前的一次次承诺 大家不会亏损这么多钱...

所有无论深浅还是使用过的用户 每一个时期都会被套住 没办法 因为没有一个周期是为了让你能成功享受一条链带来的优势和好处的，都是团队在爽 尤其是深度一直在参与着这条链的用户 从头到尾 从简单参与到被套牢，再到现在的维权无门，没办法 就是这样被动，这就是区块链 Luca的用人不慎 他几乎不管理 只吹牛逼 天天吹

详细吹了多少 完全有证据 各个视频里面都有 感谢 @jbondwagon 做了非常完整的证据截图以及视频： “我要让主播们变得他妈的超级有钱” 和 “平台上排名第一的主播在几个月内就会赚到数百万美元、数百万美元”

“Abstract 会瞬间翻盘。我认为它会以德克萨斯州一英里之遥成为最大的 L2。我认为我们从消费者的角度会做一些别人没做过的事情，不管你现在信不信”

“老兄，我相信，凭借我们对行业的了解，我们可以用几十亿美元的资金推出 Abstract。我毫不怀疑我们能做到，但我们没有这么做，因为 Abstract 瞄准的是那个 200-300 亿美元市值的大奖”

“最终你会通过 XP 分配获得奖励，你会看到那个数字上升，最终这会转化为你将在不久的将来获得的空投”

https://x.com/jbondwagon/status/2107752882296738158?s=20

这个帖子下面的跟帖全部都是Luca吹下的牛 他一个也没完成 纯吹 这也是坑死所有人的诱因 他脑子一热就可以吹ABS 脑子再一热 就能关闭ABS

有点后悔当初没看到过这些帖子： https://x.com/NFTherder/status/1710397041900224807?s=20

以及这里揭露Luca曾经的负面新闻： https://x.com/zachxbt/status/1710473640788275451?s=20 @zachxbt 看了都摇头 卢卡原来一直是那个爱骗人的卢卡

他现在只想上IPO 只想搞那个冰屋 实际上呢 他搞了两年了 现在Pengu价格跌的只剩下一点点 他团队天天还在不断地解锁卖出 $PENGU 缺钱吗？他一点不缺 但是卖是一点不耽误的 从Abstract这边赚的钱又收入囊中 实体web2还继续赚钱

总结

唉 遇到这样的项目 有啥办法呢 24年12月Pengu开始了空投，所有人沉浸在喜悦中 于是大家欣然都很愿意参与到这个

由 Founders Fund 投资
Pengu和Igloo大力支持 顶级IP 前身很不错的PENGU空投的L2

此一时彼一时 那时候还是善良人格的Luca 现在的Luca已经变了 不是那个luca了 那时候0人能预见这个项目最后落得如此丑陋的收场方式

那时候觉得 和冒险岛一样 没人愿意折腾 而且大家都成本很高 我尽量低成本获取XP总能赚吧 玩法很困难 一般越难人越少 人越少 毛越大 作为一个勤奋的人 全网都在发 不玩说不过去了 只要坚持与努力 Luca说年底会发币

OK 年底遇到大清算时代 正好就是去年的这个时间段 发生了什么大家都懂 被榨干的社区需要回血 但是市场不允许 而且团队不知道在干嘛 后续更恶劣 大家本来就在下跌中没什么动力了 半年多来大家其实也累了 发现Abstract团队没有才华 只有站在以前的平台上不断吸血的能力

但是也没办法了 剑已经出鞘 沉没成本巨高 一半只能闷着头皮支持 一半已经开喷 今年的一年具体发生了什么 如果读完到现在 应该也懂了 26年是被榨取且失败的一年 25年是高开低走的一年 走了快两年的下坡路

一条L2能有这么多故事能讲 而且发生了什么事情我都记得很清楚 真是荣幸至极 还有很多鸡毛蒜皮数不清的骚操作 赘述下去可能都得写几万字了操

如果像Base那样做的好 未来可期 留个念想 没空投我认了 如果像Scroll那样存点钱简单做点任务反撸我也认了 如果像Linea和Zksync那样复杂的一批等几年最后大毛我也认了 如果像Blast那样喜忧参半 折腾完最后发个交代的币我也认了 如果像Mega那样搞个ICO XP给我打点折 最后能回点本我也认了

可你他妈直接跑路是到底在干啥啊 为了不影响以后你的Igloo搞ipo？@LucaNetz 你这样还搞个鸡的ipo 你外国用户是最多的 我希望最后国外的朋友到时候都能成功起诉你 希望未来你上市失败的时候你只能听到虚伪的鼓励和大家最真实的谩骂🙏 你太不负责了 对所有玩家都不负责 唇亡齿寒 今天他能这样不管不顾让所支持他的链的人亏损几千万美金 明天他就能继续宣布他的下一个计划失败 然后继续在AMA和各种采访里面说自己下下个项目会做的非常牛 吹牛的牛

OK 差不多讲完了 还有很多琐碎的事就不赘述了

有空让 @acxgRMTY 这位在Abstract上的顶级韭菜继续发言，曾经他手里一堆大企鹅NFT 几十个E 几十个E的砸进去 几百万个Pengu一直持有，最近清理了一下资产——亏损一百多万 他应该还有更多想说的内容🤣

@KirisakiAria dalaoge 大佬鸽已经很久不问世事了 最近出现留言如下： “这应该能入选历史最佳垃圾项目第一”“还远不如Eclipse”

@0x3343 和 @CardNbbb 也算是中文区亏损非常大的用户了，两个人加起来应该有百万亏损，XP也是数不清的多 以前为了XP有多花钱、时间和精力 现在就有多后悔

@YNOvv1 @Blast_yanzu @14350hsi 有诺 彦祖 玫瑰 有多认真参与 多努力 也都有目共睹，长期直播 长期参与各类活动，一年多了 这个精力放在Monad上起码都是顶级Role起步 我们在Abstract上获得的Giga Chad完全没用啊 价值0 舒服 选择不对 努力全白费

@0xYy_7 鸭 唉 一切尽在不言中 我们早就觉得完蛋了 现在终于完蛋了！

@Syu990 阿猫! 曾经跟大家亦师亦友的的卡牌大师 最会玩老板牌之人 幸好早早离开abstract 不然现在不敢想有多痛苦

@wangy112375 羊桑也是最早记录的一批 认真做表格记录 最近羊桑和我一样PONS亏麻了 不过往好处想 至少没那么深度参与到Abstract 不然亏的更多 哈哈

@ziqian4965 @wuya666eth 自遣哥 无涯兄弟 大学青春荒芜在此 哈哈 没招了 我也荒芜两年

@Hack_1t3r 羽师傅技术好 找漏洞不小心误入abs 从而踏上不归路...

@Trevor_niu 当初问Role 因我才加入一个微信群 蹉跎了大半年...唉 对不起你哥 没聊到这般结果

@jeansonlau 钻石二了 马上结丹期的叮叮哥 非常的努力天天记录项目 参与打游戏...大梦一场空

@ting32510 和 @Jackdalangpa 一直在各个群聊天

@doudoukickk 唉 有这精力玩Abs 做什么都会成功的 哥

@0xHugoYYH Hugo哥 一起玩游戏的时候 很开心还是 唉 妈的全怪abs

@FeiniuBTC 酸汤肥牛哥天天玩Mog太强了 也不影响现在血本无归 哈哈

@cnmqt123 财大气粗S哥 不知亏多少 应该玩游戏或菠菜遭罪了的 出生项目方

@cosone7 677 一起玩Gigaverse...lol 内容非常细致 也很舍得投入 怀念一起讨论玩法的时光

@lin11201 雷米亏麻了的 还带了朋友一起 很痛苦

@daxianVIP 大仙也是 长期在玩游戏 认真拿XP 烧钱 现在全送项目方开party去了

@laow0423 亏了几十万 早早离场的老吴 太有钱了 到处亏还有opensea一麻袋和小狐狸一麻袋

@0xLibaTiggy 虎仔钱不当钱 也烧了一堆钱到abs 耍起嘛耍起

中文区还有很多很多很多朋友，有的兄弟账号我找不到了就不艾特了，玩Abstract的唯一收获就是认识了巨多朋友 数都数不清 一起聊别的项目 一起打打游戏啥的，真好都是好人 可惜Abstract这条链的运营团队太差了 大家在这上面的精力参与到其他任何一个同等级难度的项目上都会收获颇丰，要是在Monad或者以前Brachain那种搞个小熊之家 不敢想大家有多赚钱没办法 遇到了这样不负责 团队内部极其混乱没有规划 充满非Web3决策的一条链 也算是改变大家命运了😌

免责声明

所有内容均基于公开信息、链上数据、官方及相关人员的公开发言，以及我本人近两年作为深度用户的亲身经历整理而成。文中涉及的事件、数据和时间点都有可查证的来源，观点部分也都有事实作为依据，没有一条是空穴来风，如有任何不实之处，欢迎随时对峙，文中的评价和推测仅代表我个人观点，目的在于陈述事实、复盘经过，并非针对任何人进行人身攻击

最后想说：每一个 Abstract 参与者，都曾经认真地热爱过这条链，也热爱过 Pengu 这个 IP。走到今天这一步，不是大家的选择，而是被迫接受的结果。有人因此倾家荡产，有人在这里搭进了一两年的时间，甚至改变了自己的人生轨迹。这篇文章，是写给所有曾经认真付出过的人

RIP Abstract.

英文版本

This is going to be very long and packed with screenshots and evidence.

As someone who has been deeply involved with Abstract since mainnet launch and still remembers almost everything that happened, I want to objectively list some of the things that happened on Abstract that left a very bad impression.

After reading this, you’ll probably understand why Abstract started so high, gradually declined, and has now ended its L2 journey with such a dramatic fall.

Reading Guide

① Which ecosystem projects made money, and the major failures in ecosystem project selection:

A detailed introduction to Gacha, Amigo, Monsters, Rugpull Bakery, plus an overall review of the ecosystem.

② Financial analysis:

Several sales on Abstract, including Mystery Box, the Disney IP collaboration boxes, Ultraman lottery boxes, two girl-group badge sales, DeFiLlama revenue data, and the difficulty of earning badges.

③ Two top-level decisions that, in my view, completely destroyed Abstract + the extremely high difficulty of earning badges.

④ Referral-link issue:

The amount may not be huge, but the team’s way of operating it was still very questionable — trying to capture every last bit of value.

⑤ Abstract’s recent contradictions + some personal thoughts and complaints + how the team quickly distanced itself from responsibility.

⑥ Poor personnel choices:

Phin and Raj, the two ecosystem leads. In my view, both contributed heavily to the ecosystem problems.

⑦ Luca’s exaggerations and false promises.

There is clear evidence, including videos.

⑧ Conclusion.

① Which ecosystem projects made money, and the major failures in ecosystem project selection

Detailed introduction to Gacha, Amigo, Monsters, Rugpull Bakery + overall ecosystem review.

@gacha_game_ comes first

Gacha was one of the first ecosystem projects to join Abstract in February 2025, and it was also one of the projects that extracted the most money from users.

Its co-founder, @tanialemon_, happily announced in February 2026 — exactly one year later — that the team had reached a milestone of earning $5 million on Abstract.

At almost the same time, they basically left.

They announced a transition into TCG and shut down the scratch-card product.

At the time, the jackpot was around $70,000–$80,000, and nobody had ever won it.

The team said that the remaining jackpot would be returned to old users based on points/contribution through Gacha Pull balances.

But in reality, it was still platform credit, meaning users still had to keep opening cards or participating.

The previous jackpot was never won by anyone either.

It was basically just a marketing hook that attracted everyone.

This was one of the earliest projects introduced into the Abstract ecosystem, and it even had two badges:

• One lottery badge

• One hidden badge

It pushed everyone toward gambling and losing money.

The EV of the lottery was negative.

Most people participated mainly because of XP.

Personally, apart from doing the badge a few times and losing a few dozen dollars, I never touched it again.

But many users lost money there very early.

At that time, XP was extremely difficult to obtain.

At the same time, Luca kept hinting that there would be a token by the end of the year.

So some people, just to earn more XP, felt they had no choice but to keep spending.

It was obvious that Abstract gave Gacha almost no visible restrictions while giving it full XP support.

As a result, many of the earliest users took significant losses there.

And it wasn’t just a lack of restrictions.

The second hidden badge required users to scratch around 500 cards to unlock it.

That only encouraged even more spending on a platform that, in my opinion, had very limited real value.

Even today, there are still people playing it.

You really have to admire the spending power.

No wonder Tania said they were originally running out of money and thought the project might fail.

Then they came to Abstract and suddenly became a money-printing machine.

Now the project team is probably enjoying the results.

Gacha main contract address

0x999920ac0adb76f96f63d6aacebd8b7890ed09d2

Protocol fee address

0x3272596F776470D2D7C3f7dfF3dc50888b7D8967

Here is another set of data:

According to DeFiLlama, this product generated approximately $15.55 million in cumulative fees on Abstract.

After subtracting the portion used for buybacks or returned to players, current protocol net revenue was approximately $3.09 million.

And where did that money come from?

Mostly from early users. 😄

@TryAmigoApp This one was also unbelievable.

I genuinely cannot understand the thinking behind introducing a product that looked like a social app on the surface but was basically PvP underneath.

Founder @BeanzJonny showed up for the last time around April 2026.

After that, once the project could no longer attract enough money, it basically disappeared.

Abstract had spent a lot of effort promoting this project.

And in early 2026, it again extracted a lot of money from users.

I personally participated zero times.

I also kept telling people in WeChat groups not to participate because I thought the project was very poor.

Unsurprisingly, many people in the international community got hit badly.

Right from the start, you could only play by downloading the app.

It was already hard to imagine that a wallet ecosystem that barely supported mobile properly would choose this launch method.

The project had supposedly been preparing and warming up for more than half a year.

Yet when it launched, there wasn’t even a web version.

Then there was the Key system.

Just like a token launch, only selected people were able to issue Keys.

Users had to buy them.

If nobody bought, the price wouldn’t rise.

Anyone buying later was basically taking over someone else’s position.

Meanwhile, the people issuing Keys could continuously earn fees.

Key trading opened on March 6, 2026.

A few days later, people realized nobody was really playing.

Then came promises about lowering fees, launching a web version, and so on.

Even developing the web version somehow became a life-or-death struggle.

Was this really a project that had been preparing for half a year?

In the end, the web version never properly launched before the whole thing quietly ended.

I don’t know who introduced this project.

But whoever made the decision to support and heavily promote something like this clearly made a very poor judgment.

The hype at the time made it sound like this was going to be some amazing product.

Looking back, it was difficult to understand.

The whole thing also gave off a strong “friends-and-connections” feeling.

I don’t know whose connection it was.

The founder originally had only around one or two hundred followers.

Later, it looked like someone else may have taken over.

Then suddenly it returned in February 2026 and received aggressive promotion.

So the obvious question is:

How did a founder like this get connected to Abstract?

Why did this project deserve so much promotion?

And why was Abstract still pushing projects like this during such a dangerous period for the ecosystem?

Even when the ecosystem itself was struggling to survive, users were still being encouraged to keep spending.

POV:

“Who still has spare money?”

Now let me introduce the next one:@monstersdotfun.

Yes.The project that once had some of the biggest promotion, one of the highest mint prices, and one of the fastest fund-raising events.

It had around 136K followers.

It hasn’t updated in about a year.

And in my opinion, it deserves to be remembered as one of Abstract’s most embarrassing ecosystem cases.

At the end of April 2025, they sold access and benefits before the game even launched.

They officially announced 750 Genesis NFTs** at 0.125 ETH each.

That means they collected:93.75 ETHin mint fees.

Then the floor price once went above $2,000.

What happened afterward?

It went straight down.

Eventually, the price fell to around $1.

Great, right?

The NFT contract on OpenSea is:

0x38272b362bca267dc8e9120087c93cefb86a69ac

Anyone interested can go take a look.

This project is genuinely fascinating.

As a “game,” its website basically showed a few pets jumping around.

That was enough to collect hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The founder has long disappeared and the relevant presence was basically deleted.

Do you understand?

The biggest selling point was that Abstract heavily supported it.

The website leaderboard rewards included things like:

• “Platform fee sharing”

• “Future token airdrops”

Then the project disappeared.

And Abstract basically did nothing publicly.

It was treated as if nothing had happened.

The project was simply allowed to vanish.

Who connected them?

Nobody knows.

Was it introduced through someone’s personal network?

Was there some deeper relationship behind it?

I cannot prove that.

But if there was, it would be extremely disappointing.

And if there wasn’t, then the level of project selection was simply extremely poor.

Users were basically treated as the exit liquidity for other people’s projects.

A lot of people bought this NFT and watched it go almost completely to zero.

This is still one of the darkest parts of Abstract’s community history.

This year, the team made another “very interesting” attempt: @OnchainChemists.

In my personal view, there is a very high chance this project had unusually close ties to the team.

The account was registered around the end of February.

In March, it immediately appeared in Abstract Spotlight Apps.

Luca and several team members followed it almost immediately.

The game was called *Rugpull Bakery*.

Its Chinese nickname was basically “Happy Bread Baking.”

What was it actually?

An automatic gas-contribution machine.

Players competed for ranking by continuously sending transactions and paying gas fees.

Those gas fees became chain revenue.

Only the top three players received rewards.

Everyone else’s fees became revenue for Abstract.

And even getting into the top three was extremely difficult.

Meanwhile, there was basically no effective restriction on scripts or bots.

That made it very easy for the whole system to become distorted.

In my opinion, it was a very poor flywheel design.

When it launched in March, I initially thought:

Finally, the project team is doing something.

They even released a badge with it.

That also brought another wave of spending.

Season 1 data:

• Users spent around *$173,000* on transactions

• Prize pool was around *$76,000*

• So net user loss was around *$97,000*

• More than *10 million transactions* were generated

That also explains why the DeFiLlama numbers looked strange during that period.

The platform must have enjoyed all that activity.

A lot of users from the Chinese community, including the group around Meow, spent heavily.

In the end, many of them were pushed out of the top three anyway.

Later seasons became even more extreme.

Season 2 was changed to seven days.

Rewards went to the top five.

At the same time, people kept complaining about bots and alternate accounts effectively “rugging” each other.

Everyone lost more money.

Eventually, people stopped playing.

And I was left asking:

*What exactly is the team doing?*

Overall ecosystem review

The quality of projects introduced to Abstract was extremely poor.

Honestly, getting the selection process this consistently wrong almost takes a certain level of skill.

Myriad

I don’t know who introduced this one.

It was already there when Abstract launched.

AMM trading usually charged around *3%*.

Liquidity was extremely poor.

And orders were basically blind.

You couldn’t clearly see the depth of orders or counterparty liquidity.

In my opinion, the product experience was terrible.

Yet during the same period, its data looked very strong.

Today, it is basically irrelevant.

In March this year, CZ mentioned it once.

Immediately afterward, it started shifting its attention away from Abstract and toward BSC.

The funny part is that this was still considered one of the better projects on Abstract.

Why?Because users could farm XP through cheap transactions.

You only needed to spend a small amount on gas to generate a high ranking and earn a lot of XP.

A lot of users quietly did this last year.

You can basically understand it as XP farming.

The problem was that so many ecosystem projects were poor that this kind of low-cost farming became one of the few reasonable strategies.

Roach Racing Club

This was actually one of the few games that was reasonably playable.

But even its project founder, @0xroachcoach, eventually couldn’t take it anymore.

In May 2026, they chose to leave Abstract.

Moody Madness

This one also felt like a project connected through existing relationships.

It kept extracting money from users through all kinds of passes and game participation.

During the early and middle stages, it gave relatively high XP.

Later there were also those marble-style games.

Again, much of it felt like activity created mainly to generate transactions for the chain.

The chain effectively forced users and ecosystem projects to produce data in order to earn XP.

There was no choice.

A lot of this activity had very little real meaning.

A game that might get heavily criticized on a casual gaming platform somehow became one of Abstract’s top ecosystem contributors. 🤣

And to this day, I still don’t know how much money it made.

Some events even offered prizes of only around *$100*.

Very generous.

Office Worker and Gigaverse

Office Worker was originally doing fine.

Eventually, it couldn’t sustain itself, issued a batch of NFTs, and then faded away.

Gigaverse started very strong and then gradually declined.

It became absorbed in its own rock-paper-scissors gameplay.

Later, the large-world expansion also failed to meet expectations.

Now the whole team seems to be seriously running YouTube channels.

What can I say?

I bought the Juice membership for hundreds of dollars.

I bought ROMs.

I also spent a lot of time writing guides.

I did all of that because I wanted other users to avoid unnecessary mistakes.

Looking back now, I realized the very beginning itself may have been the wrong road.

There’s really nothing to say.

Cambria...Forget it.

I’m not even going to sigh anymore.

There were also:

• Dojo

• Deathfun

• Witty

• BLINKO

• Laser Party

Most of them were gambling-related.

And in my view, most of them were basically *100% negative-EV gambling*.

So again:

Where did all the money go?

Were these projects independently built?

Were they brought in through connections?

Some projects had only dozens or hundreds of followers and could still get listed on Portal.

If you tell me relationships played absolutely no role, I personally find that difficult to believe.

---

Some time ago, *Stonkbrokers @ClutchMarkets* became very popular on Robinhood.

They had contacted Abstract last year.

And according to what was publicly said, Raj blocked them.

Can you believe that?

Abstract’s ability to select dApps was extremely weak.

It wasn’t only games and gambling.

The same problem existed in DeFi.

Luca said:

“Liquidity was insufficient.”

But whose responsibility was that?

The ecosystem team mostly connected with small DeFi workshops.

That naturally made people frustrated.

Why not connect with mainstream DeFi projects?

Why not coordinate incentives using PENGU or other assets?

Instead, the ecosystem was filled with small projects like Kona and Aborean.

If those weren’t relationship-driven projects, then the selection process itself was still hard to understand.

No incentives?

Then why would anyone put TVL into Abstract?

If money is deposited into the wallet:

• You can’t really play memes properly

• NFT activity is limited

• Strong developers have difficulty entering

• There are barriers everywhere

Abstract had a huge filtering layer.

It was like the Apple App Store.

But imagine if the reviewer kept choosing weak projects while capable developers were left outside.

Then naturally, stronger teams go somewhere like Robinhood and build there instead.

That is why I keep asking:

Do you really understand how to build an L2?

If so many core things cannot be done properly, then why build one in the first place?

---

Kona and Aborean

I won’t even spend much time criticizing Kona.

It was very average.

Aborean’s dual-token model looked like something from years ago.

Then there was @Aborean and founder Alexander.

Every day, he posted mysterious pictures with unclear meaning.

Market-making ABX.

Selling ABX.

Chinese whale @Jackwelth criticized him publicly several times.

So why was this still treated as part of Abstract’s DeFi foundation?

In May 2026, the project even announced it was moving to Ethereum mainnet and launching another token.

That attracted another group of international users into ABX.

Many of them then suffered losses again. 😜

And then the explanation is simply:

“Abstract’s DeFi ecosystem lacked liquidity.”

Okay.

Then tell us:What exactly did you do about it, @LucaNetz?

Apart from @Skarly’s Onchain Heroes and the Penguin-themed Vibes TCG, which in my opinion were genuinely good projects from beginning to end, most other projects either came mainly to make money or were simply not strong enough.

Now even the good ones have to migrate toward Robinhood.

---

There was also Beans from the Abstract team (not to be confused with Amigo founder @BeanzJonny).

He had already gone to Robinhood to start something of his own quite a while ago.

Maybe he already knew what direction things were going.

At least he got an early start on making money for his next chapter.lmao

---

② Financial analysis

Several sales on Abstract:

• Mystery Box

• Disney IP collaboration boxes

• Ultraman lottery boxes

• Two girl-group badge sales

• DeFiLlama revenue data

• Badge difficulty

Black Friday Mystery Box

The first big monetization wave.

It went on sale on November 28 last year.

It was marketed as a 48-hour limited sale.

The FOMO was intense.

It sold out very quickly.

Everyone was promoting it.

Wallets that minted could also receive a non-transferable SBT.

Wow.

An SBT.

Amazing.

The price was $99.99 each.

It seems that more than 7,000 were sold.

That means another $700,000+ came in comfortably.

And all that was needed was to send out some small Shenzhen-made toys or similar items.

Making money looked surprisingly easy.

Some people rushed to buy many of them.

For example, @YNOvv1.

That one definitely hurt. 😂

Disney IP collaboration

Second major monetization wave.

Cryptoys made Mickey and Friends.

This was not Igloo’s own box.

Promotion started on December 15 last year.

Sales began on December 17.

Each blind box cost $40.

Inside was an upgradeable 3D toy NFT.

Portal released two badges:

• Collect one to receive a Flash Badge — effectively a $40 cost

• Collect ten to receive another hidden badge — effectively around $400

People inside the Abstract ecosystem, including Shiv who was still on the team at the time, publicly promoted it.

People were also told the badge gave around 2,000 XP.

So during the sale, everyone rushed to buy.

A lot of people bought many boxes.

I personally bought a few across different accounts.

I lost more than $100.

Very nice.

Was this sale profitable?

Of course.

How many were sold?

Around 5,000

*5,000 × $40 = $200,000*

Yes.Another *$200K* generated almost overnight.

Lovely, @LucaNetz.So naturally:

LFG.

Time for the third wave.

Ultraman IP collaboration

Third wave.

Ultraman / Tsuburaya.

Released through Bythen on Abstract.

Promotion began around *January 26* this year.

On January 28, the Flash Badge launched.

To claim it, users had to buy one blind box from Bythen Treasure.

Each box cost around *$3*.

I don’t know exactly how many boxes were sold.

The badge shows around *13,350 holders*.

A rough estimate might be around *20,000–40,000 boxes sold*.

So revenue could have been anywhere from around *$60K to $120K*.

What did users get?

A cute *The Ultra Badge*.

And some NFTs that almost nobody wanted after combining them.

This NFT campaign also caused losses for many users.

So again:

Where did the money go?

The quality of the Ultraman IP collaboration itself was also questionable in my view.

It felt more like a very lightweight licensing arrangement.

Yet it still managed to pull in this much money.

---

Earlier girl-group collaborations

There were also two earlier collaborations last year:

• tripleS Badge

• ARTMS Superfan Badge

Both had badges.

Each cost about $3.30.

You needed to buy at least one to claim the badge.

On-chain data showed:

• tripleS badge: around 25,000

• ARTMS badge: around 16,000

Total:41,000

So that alone was probably another $120K–$150K in spending.

And what did we get in return?

Maybe Luca got some nice photos with the girl groups.

Good for him.

---

Just these few examples already add up to around a million dollars in user spending.

And that’s only a small sample.

And all of this revenue went straight to Abstract and Pengu — no third party was taking a cut.

So when @LucaNetz talks about losing tens of millions of dollars, I genuinely struggle to understand where all that money went.

---

Then I opened DeFiLlama:

defillama.com/revenue/chain/abstract

And I found that the data seemed to show Abstract had generated plenty of revenue.

So where did the money go?

Please publish the breakdown.

If I can see that the money was genuinely spent in the right places, I will stop questioning it immediately.

Did it go to salaries?

Operating expenses?

Partnerships?

A few thousand dollars in gas revenue was being collected every day for a long time.

How did the project still run out of money?

Is operating an L2 really that expensive?

Or was spending six months building Dark Mode — and then announcing it to the world — somehow extremely expensive?

Did things like that really consume tens of millions of Igloo’s money?

③ Two top-level decisions that completely damaged Abstract + extremely difficult badges

Two historic-level policy changes. In my view, these two decisions seriously damaged Abstract.

First decision

On October 21 last year, XP from passively holding NFTs and memes was cut by roughly half. Abstract itself was supposed to be an L2 centered heavily around memes. Yet holding and playing memes suddenly gave almost no XP. Shortly after the announcement, meme prices across the ecosystem collapsed. At the time, many international users were launching tokens on Abstract, forming groups, trading, and having fun. Maybe the Abstract team felt they weren’t benefiting enough from that activity.

Whatever the reason, the change basically cut the entire meme ecosystem off at once. A large number of people left.

Second decision

On March 17 this year, Abstract announced that simply holding NFTs would no longer give XP. Only selected official NFTs would still receive XP. And even then, there were ranking requirements and various additional rules. It was extremely frustrating. Collections like:

• BUUMEE

• pengztracted

• Glowbud

had floor prices of around 0.01 ETH before the change. After the XP cut, many of them effectively went to zero. Everyone had been playing normally. Then one policy change completely changed the value structure. After that, NFTs could barely develop on a chain where XP was controlled so heavily from the top. Only a few collections survived. The whole thing became meaningless. XP effectively became a centralized tool that could determine the value of everyone’s assets.

People hit by those two changes probably suffered huge losses. I didn’t play memes, so I didn’t lose much from the first one. But I had been holding NFTs for XP. After the second change, more than one hundred NFTs I held basically collapsed. Several thousand dollars became close to zero. That is where most of my major Abstract losses came from. Robinhood later showed that memes, NFTs, tokenized stocks, and all kinds of developers can be allowed to grow freely and still create a successful ecosystem.

Abstract went in the opposite direction. Somebody made decisions that effectively killed memes and NFTs. How was the chain supposed to survive after that? For users, it felt like capital extraction with very little in return. But what could anyone do? The team controlled the rules. Users had already invested money. Everyone kept hearing that TGE would come by the end of the year. So most people simply endured it.

The thinking was: Fine. Cut it if you want. We’ll complain a little now. After TGE, we can talk about everything properly. At the time, everyone still had to keep going.

Badge difficulty was extremely high

Open the badge page and look at that entire wall of badges. How much money did all those badges generate? I don’t know. Each badge had thousands or tens of thousands of users minting it. Every single campaign could generate some spending. @LucaNetz, do you know how complicated some of these badges were? Do you know how difficult they were to earn? Do you know how much money some of the circled badges required? Try standing from the user’s perspective.

Try completing every single badge yourself. Then you would understand how difficult it was. Do you know how hard badges like *Clippy* and *The Threadoor* were? Some took months of effort. Many ecosystem badges required users to spend money while also completing tasks. And then you say Abstract didn’t make money? Really? Sometimes I genuinely wished the people making these rules had to sit in front of a computer and personally complete every one of these tasks from beginning to end. Maybe then they would understand what the user experience was actually like.

④ Referral-link issue

The amount itself may not have been huge. But the way the team operated it was still worth discussing. On the official Discover page, many direct links that could include a referral code did include one. The purpose was obviously to collect referral commissions. Even very small amounts were not left on the table. Examples included:- Gigaverse - BigCoin - Deathfun and so on

and others. Most of them used invitation links. What were those commissions used for? After collecting them for more than a year, last month all of the funds were bridged away. 🤣 Every possible bit of revenue was captured. Even referral commissions generated from partner projects were collected. Here is the wallet that received referral-chain revenue:

portal.abs.xyz/profile/0x66aC98701bb48926114577bA85e0D0487a9CD2dA

DeBank shows that in September 2026, these funds were transferred to:

0x37232647E0f7A48A256f13fDF4a8ABa4Fe6259E4

Then they were successfully bridged out through Stargate. After that, the funds went through @RAILGUN_Project, an EVM privacy protocol. Very careful. That makes it difficult for outsiders to see the final destination. It doesn’t prove it outright, but the timing says a lot: they were already planning to exit a month earlier. It also naturally raises questions about who ultimately controlled the money and where it went.

Previously, the explanation was that referral income went into the treasury. Now, given everything that happened, users naturally want more transparency about which treasury that actually referred to.

⑤ Abstract’s recent situation and contradictions + some personal thoughts

In August 2026, some members of the Abstract team were still working hard. Maybe because they were preparing for a token. At that time, people said plans were already being made for a token launch. There was cooperation with OpenWorld. TGE-related work was supposedly being handed over to OW or something similar. To stabilize the community, the team arranged calls with users. I was fortunate enough to be selected as one of the main users and was given a time slot for a call.

I didn’t answer. Because I thought it would mostly be repetitive reassurance. I didn’t think it was necessary. Later, friends told me the message was basically: Don’t leave. Keep believing. Phase 2 is coming soon. A token is coming. There will be an outcome by the end of the year. So... I started checking in even more seriously. Even when I was traveling, I didn’t forget about it. I would often go home and carefully log into both my main account and alternate accounts to check in.

I also didn’t withdraw my funds. I kept them in DeFi. Even though there was barely any XP left. At that time, team leader Cygaar had already been missing publicly for months. I still held onto one last hope: At least give users some kind of conclusion. Even if it was just a “closure token.” For top users with:Giga role、other high-level roles、Platinum、Diamond

maybe people could at least recover a little bit. My expectations were already extremely low. A few thousand dollars would have been enough. Compared with the expectations from the year before, when people thought they might receive tens of thousands or even over $100K in airdrops, I had already lowered my expectations as far as possible.

Now, looking back, the situation was extremely contradictory. Some team members kept saying they were bullish. They said everything was still moving according to plan. They said nothing had gone wrong. Meanwhile, other team members were leaving one after another. And some people who left immediately turned around and criticized the Abstract community, argued with users, or posted sarcastic comments. For several months, the whole project seemed stuck between: TGE or no TGE.

Then recently, Luca apparently made the final call. No token. Then the project was renamed. And on October 6, the failure announcement came.

---

Apart from completing badges, I basically did: 0 gambling and 0 meme speculation. I know very well how gambling can end. Someone in my family once nearly lost everything because of gambling. So every time I completed a badge, I immediately posted image guides or video tutorials. There was only one purpose: A lot of people were participating in Abstract. Everyone had already invested a lot. Many people early on couldn’t control their spending or didn’t understand how to play efficiently.

I made badge guides and shared different methods mainly to save people time and help them spend less. For projects that obviously looked like they were going to disappear or heavily monetize users, I generally did not participate and did not promote them. Apart from necessary badge tutorials and guides for ecosystem games or tools, I generally didn’t spend money randomly. I didn’t touch memes at all. I mostly just deposited money.

Tens of thousands of dollars. Thousands of dollars. Some accounts had money sitting there for half a year. Just to earn XP. At times, I had tens of thousands or even more than $100K spread across Abstract-related wallets and accounts. That carried real risk. Abstract had experienced security incidents before. Every day, I worried that some DeFi protocol on the chain might disappear. Because Kona and Aborean never exactly made me feel fully relaxed.

Fortunately, nothing I used fully rugged. Otherwise I would have been in serious trouble. For that, I’m grateful. But after taking all that risk, I ended up with a huge amount of XP worth basically zero. So the gratitude only goes so far.

---

My main losses came from two places. First: Maybe around $50–$100+ per account on average completing badges. Second: At the end of last year, I bought a huge number of NFTs. Why? Because holding NFTs gave XP. An NFT might cost just over $20. Hold it for one week and do nothing. You might receive one or two thousand XP. If it were you, would you buy it? It was just like finding the lowest-cost route in every project.

Once we researched the method, we bought a lot. And for several months, it worked. Prices remained around $20+. Everyone steadily earned:

• Tens of thousands of XP per week

• Sometimes hundreds of thousands

My main account earned more than 100K XP per week. Alternate accounts earned tens of thousands. At that time, when you calculated the possible value of XP... Oh wow. It felt like maybe we had found something huge. Then one day in March 2026, Abstract announced: NFTs no longer give XP. At that moment, the feeling changed immediately. People holding thousands or tens of thousands of dollars worth of NFTs watched them collapse toward zero. Wonderful.

---

After the NFT losses, I actually did very little this year. There was still a group playing Mog, Toll, and similar games every day. There were also many beginners. Many new users. They didn’t know the history of Abstract. They kept playing. We tried to warn people when we could. Because most of the top Chinese users all knew each other. And by then, almost everyone had already lost confidence. At the beginning of the year, the Abstract team kept making decisions that were difficult to understand.

Later, almost every new move became something the community laughed at. So I stopped updating related content. I mostly focused on other projects and activities. But because the sunk cost was already so large, I could only continue watching. Watching Abstract gradually damage its own community. Watching trust disappear step by step.

---

International users complained every day. I went over and liked their posts every day to support them. It didn’t help. The team barely listened to any advice. They simply continued doing what they wanted. They stayed on the same path until the very end. So what exactly was @LucaNetz doing? He seemed focused every day on building his big Web2 ambitions. Meanwhile, people who, in my view, did not fully understand how Web3 users behave were operating an L2.

They repeatedly extracted value from the community through their own systems. Maybe they already knew Abstract would fail. Maybe they genuinely believed their strategy could still work. I don’t know. Raj said he had worked hundreds of hours over the past two years. That made me laugh a little. Every serious Abstract user also spent hundreds of hours on this ecosystem. Team members like Raj were at least being paid while doing it.

Users spent their own money. And now some former team members can simply move on and find another Web3 job. The users are the ones left holding the losses. The team also appeared highly fragmented. Everyone seemed to be doing their own thing. There was very little coordination. Many decisions felt nothing like decisions made by people who had actually spent years participating in Web3 as users.

---

Okay. I’ve talked enough about that. Back to the main point. On October 6, the project announced the failure and withdrawal process. So what exactly had the official accounts been doing over the past few months? The official account was posting things like:

> “Do you still believe in Abstract? If yes, leave your AGW address.”

> “Stay focused.”

> “Abstract’s new star players.”

POV: Imagine being asked to operate an account where your daily job is just to post things like this. And the most unbelievable part? Last week it was still Happy XP Day. This week? Complete failure announcement. Meanwhile:

• The fund-migration website was already prepared

• The updated user agreement was already prepared

• The wording was already prepared

Just like @0xSinet said: Abstract basically held wallet access behind an agreement checkbox. If you didn’t check the box, you couldn’t access the wallet normally. According to the summary circulating in the community, by checking it, users agreed to things including:

1. Arbitration only, no class-action lawsuits.

2. Their maximum liability to you is $100, or the amount of fees you paid them.

3. If you lose access to your wallet or funds, they may not be responsible even where negligence is alleged.

4. You have one year to bring a claim.

5. Your XP remains as an off-chain record for six months.

Direct link: https://x.com/0xSinet/status/2107655973573664958?s=20

---

⑥ TeamPhin and Raj

Phin @PhinTotten left in October 2025. And then there is the current @RajPatel. In my view, these two are also a major part of why the ecosystem developed the way it did. They appear to get along very well. When Phin was still at Abstract, many of the things done under his ecosystem/marketing responsibility were, in my view, poor decisions. During that period, community users suffered huge losses. Some large users lost hundreds of thousands of dollars.

He was one of the main outward-facing ecosystem and marketing people at the time. Portal listings and badge traffic were closely related to that area. So it is reasonable to assume that many of the weak projects discussed earlier went through the ecosystem-selection process under his watch. Being able to select so many poor projects is certainly impressive in its own way. Then, after leaving during a period of major decline, he quickly distanced himself from the ecosystem.

Later, he repeatedly mocked or argued with parts of the community. It is difficult to summarize. Anyone who seriously used Abstract and followed the community probably understands why many users strongly dislike him. When he left, his farewell message sounded very emotional and talked about how much he loved Abstract. After leaving, the tone changed quickly. Maybe something happened behind the scenes. I don’t know. But in my view, his work had a very large influence on the direction the ecosystem took.

He also clearly enjoys a confident public persona and sometimes mocks other people. Now @yeet has him as a marketing lead. Good luck with that. lol A real master of changing positions.

---

Then there is @RajPatel. From the outside, it often looked like when things became difficult, he simply went back to interacting with Phin. The two seem extremely close. Whether they simply share the same views or have coordinated behind the scenes is impossible for me to know. But from a community perspective, watching both current and former ecosystem figures act like this while Abstract was falling apart was certainly frustrating.

There were also images of the two making middle-finger gestures at users while celebrating at a party. At the same time, Abstract users were dealing with the feeling of being rugged. Nice job. Maybe they thought it looked cool. But the timing was certainly interesting. I hope they remember those photos if one day they have to face much harsher criticism from the community.

---

My issue with these two is simple: Even if they did some good work, their behavior afterward left many long-term users with a terrible impression. It felt like benefiting from the ecosystem when things were good, then turning around and mocking it after leaving. Phin reportedly cleared and sold assets from his wallet soon after leaving. From the user’s perspective, it looked like someone who knew when to exit and moved quickly.

To use a Chinese-style comparison: Phin and Raj sometimes reminded me of people who are extremely good at changing sides whenever the situation changes. As for the other team members, I don’t want to attack everyone. It is obvious who actually worked and who mostly gave the community generic responses. If you received your salary and quietly left, fine. I also understand that Luca reportedly restricted team members from responding or giving personal opinions. Luca chose to take responsibility himself. In practice, however, much of the response still looked like silence.

---

⑦ Finally, Luca’s exaggerations and false promises

There is evidence for this. There are videos. Without Luca repeatedly making those promises, users would not have lost this much money. Users at every level — deep users or casual users — ended up stuck at different stages. There was almost no period where users could simply enjoy the advantages and benefits of the chain without being pushed toward another incentive. The deepest users suffered the most. From early participation, to becoming increasingly committed, to eventually being unable to recover much of what they put in.

That is how passive users became. That is blockchain. Luca made poor personnel choices. In my view, he did very little direct management. But he loved talking about huge future outcomes. Again and again. There is plenty of evidence. Various videos contain these statements. Thanks to @jbondwagon for putting together very complete screenshots and video evidence. Examples include statements like:

> “I’m going to make streamers really, really rich.”

And:

> “The number-one streamer on the platform is going to make millions and millions of dollars within months.”

Another statement was essentially:

> “Abstract is going to flip everything instantly. I think it will become the biggest L2 by a Texas mile. I think from a consumer perspective we are going to do things nobody else has done, whether you believe it right now or not.”

Another:

> “Bro, I genuinely believe that with our understanding of the industry, we could launch Abstract with billions of dollars behind it. I have no doubt we could do it. But we didn’t, because Abstract is targeting that $20–30 billion market-cap prize.”

And one of the most important statements for users:

> “Eventually, you will receive rewards through XP distribution. You will see that number go up, and eventually it will translate into an airdrop you receive in the not-too-distant future.”

Source: https://x.com/jbondwagon/status/2107752882296738158?s=20

The replies under that post contain many more examples of Luca’s previous claims. Almost none of the major expectations were fulfilled. That is one of the biggest reasons users stayed. When the founder keeps talking positively about Abstract, users naturally keep believing. And then one day, the same founder can decide the Abstract plan is over.

---

I regret not seeing some of these older posts earlier: https://x.com/NFTherder/status/1710397041900224807?s=20

And here is another post discussing earlier controversy around Luca: https://x.com/zachxbt/status/1710473640788275451?s=20

Even @zachxbt had concerns back then. Looking back now, maybe the warning signs were always there.

---

Today, Luca seems mainly focused on an IPO. Focused on Igloo. In reality, he has already been working on that for around two years. Meanwhile, PENGU’s price has fallen dramatically from its previous highs. The team continues unlocking and selling $PENGU according to the token schedule. Does that mean they are short of money? It doesn’t look that way. But token sales continue. At the same time, the money made from Abstract went into their own pockets. And his Web2 business keeps making money.

---

Conclusion

What can you really do when you run into a project like this? In December 2024, PENGU began its airdrop. Everyone was extremely happy. So naturally, people were excited to participate in a project that had:

• Investment from Founders Fund

• Strong support from PENGU and Igloo

• A top-tier IP

• An L2 connected to a previous PENGU airdrop that had gone very well

Things were different back then. Back then, Luca still appeared to be someone the community could trust. Today, users see him very differently. At that time, almost nobody could have predicted that the project would end in such an ugly way.

---

At the beginning, I thought: This is like MapleStory. Most people won’t want to go through something this complicated. And everyone’s costs are high. If I find the lowest-cost way to farm XP, surely I can still make money. The harder something is, the fewer people participate. The fewer people participate, the bigger the potential reward. As someone willing to work hard, I kept seeing Abstract everywhere online. It felt strange not to participate.

As long as I stayed consistent and worked hard, Luca said there would be a token by year-end. Okay. Then year-end arrived. And the market entered a huge liquidation period. Everyone knows what happened. The community had already been drained and needed time to recover. But the market didn’t allow that. And the team’s later decisions became even worse. People were already losing motivation because the market was falling.

After more than half a year, users were tired. People gradually realized the Abstract team did not have the level of execution many of us originally expected. What it did seem very good at was using the platform and incentives it had already built to keep users spending. But there was no way out. The sword had already been drawn. Sunk cost was enormous. Half the users kept supporting the project with their heads down. The other half had already started openly criticizing it.

If you have read everything up to this point, you probably understand roughly what happened throughout 2026. For many users: 2026 was the year of being repeatedly monetized while the ecosystem failed. 2025 was the year Abstract started high and gradually declined. It spent almost two years moving downhill.

For one L2 to have this many stories is honestly impressive. And I still remember almost everything that happened. What an honor. There are many more small incidents and strange decisions I haven’t even written about. If I continued, this could easily become tens of thousands of words.

If Abstract had been like Base — strong execution and a future worth looking forward to — then even with no airdrop, I could accept it. If it had been like Scroll — deposit some money, complete simple tasks, get a disappointing result — I could accept that too. If it had been like Linea or zkSync — extremely complicated, wait years, but eventually receive a meaningful reward — I could accept that. If it had been like Blast — mixed feelings, lots of activity, but at least a token at the end — I could accept that.

If it had been like Mega — do an ICO, use XP to give me some discount, and at least let me recover part of the cost — I could accept that too. But simply ending everything like this? What exactly was the point? Was it to reduce the impact on Igloo’s future IPO plans? @LucaNetz, if this is how long-term supporters are treated, I genuinely wonder how future public-market investors are supposed to view the story. A large portion of your user base is international.

I hope the users who believe they have legitimate claims are able to pursue whatever lawful options are available to them. If the IPO eventually struggles, the public reaction will probably be very different from the optimistic words heard during the good times. The issue is responsibility. Today, a project supported by so many users can fail and leave users with tens of millions of dollars in losses. Tomorrow, another ambitious plan can also be announced and then abandoned. And afterward, another AMA or interview can simply promise that the next project will be incredible. That is exactly why trust matters.

Okay. That is roughly everything. There are many smaller details I won’t expand on.

There are many, many, many more friends in the Chinese community. Some accounts I can’t find anymore, so I won’t tag everyone. The only real reward I got from playing Abstract was meeting a huge number of people. Too many to count. We talked about other projects together. Played games together. Shared information. It was genuinely good. Most people were good people. Unfortunately, the operating team behind Abstract was simply too weak.

If everyone had invested this same amount of time and energy into almost any other project with a similar difficulty level, the outcome could have been much better. If all this effort had gone into Monad, or something like the old Berachain community house... I honestly can’t imagine how much better the result could have been. But there’s nothing we can do. We happened to choose a chain that, in my view, had:

• irresponsible execution

• major internal confusion

• weak planning

• many decisions disconnected from actual Web3 users

And in the end, that choice genuinely changed the outcome of nearly two years of effort for many people. 😌

Participating in Abstract was also really nice. I met a lot of great foreign friends who were all involved in it. Luca and the team he picked to build Abs were really inexperienced. He is 100% the one who owes everyone an apology, not that it's anyone's own fault. Thanks everyone for your support bro.

Just taking a glance, many posts are about people we know speaking up for their rights, all good brothers. There are still many brothers missing, I couldn't find some names here. Sorry if I didn't tag anyone：

@0xSinet @0xWabo @Danfffo @Azino_x @nftgoy @cryptory4n @codystreams @dreweth @yesyes @AiNftLabs @bycoinraven @Souel04 @zaddyfi @Joobs155 @gucci_gcc @dustinvibes @Deko1x @enftsar @codystreams @GMB_XBT @jbondwagon @0xCrocy @Aaiisha_Onchain @coinwithpanda @0xCragHack @Dominikz177

Your content is all great. Many of you are always able to hit the nail on the head when pointing out the team’s problems. Keep being honest!

Come quick @waleswoosh @yellowpantherx @SEC @zachxbt bros, this is getting lively lol~

A note on the translation

The original article was written in Chinese, and the Chinese version is the authoritative one. I'm including this English version so more people can read it, but it was translated with AI, so some wording may not fully capture what I meant. All images, screenshots and supporting evidence are attached in the Chinese version. If anything is unclear or seems off, feel free to leave a comment and I'll reply or correct it. For a clearer reading, you can also paste the Chinese original into an AI tool and ask it to help explain it.

Disclaimer

Everything in this article is based on public information, on-chain data, public statements from the team and related figures, and my own experience as a deep user over nearly two years. The events, figures, and dates mentioned can all be traced to verifiable sources, and every opinion is grounded in facts. Nothing here is made up. If anything is inaccurate, anyone is welcome to challenge it with evidence at any time, and I will correct it publicly.

The assessments and interpretations in this article are my personal opinions. The goal is to lay out the facts and look back on what happened, not to personally attack anyone.

Finally: every Abstract participant once genuinely loved this chain and the Pengu IP. Ending up here was not our choice; it was forced on us. Some people lost almost everything. Others gave a year or two of their lives to this place, and for some it changed the course of their lives. This article is for everyone who once truly gave their all.